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WHY DID EUROPE NEED THE MARSHALL PLAN 
IN 1947?
1. Academics are often perceived by the general public as 
people with an exceptional capacity for wasting their time, one 
of their favourite occupations being trying to give complicated 
answers to irrelevant or banal questions. It is very likely that 
the title of this paper will be seen by many as falling into the 
category of questions that have an obvious answer, the answer 
presumably being: Europe needed Marshall Aid because of the
physical devastation caused by the war. A more complete answer, 
I think, would run as follows: the devastation brought about by
the war forced the European countries to devote all possible 
resources to reconstruction, thus reducing the volume of exports 
below their usual level while increasing the volume of imports 
above normal levels. This created a huge current account deficit 
with the US, the only country that could supply the food, the raw 
materials and the industrial machinery which Europe desperately 
needed for her reconstruction.
I have said that this would be the presumable answer because, 
as the question is not asked, it is extremely unusual for someone 
to consider this problem with any care. The devastation and the 
critical shortages prevailing in Europe during the early post-war 
period were so obvious that it is not surprising that they 
dominated the picture.
Recent research has been mainly concerned with two other 
problems: 1) why did the US grant the necessary aid, and 2) how
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If, caricaturing the political scientists who caricature 
economists, we divide the problem into the forces that governed 
the supply of, and the demand for, the Marshall Plan, we see that 
both categories do not have to deal directly with our question: 
that is, why was there a need for the Marshall Plan at all. They 
deal with questions that, from the logical point of view, arise 
after our problem.
This paper deals with the explanation that Europe needed the 
Marshall Plan in 1947 because of the wartime destruction she had 
suffered. After stressing that there was an unexpected crisis in 
1947, data of European production is presented from which it is 
clear that recovery in production in physical terms was quite 
satisfactory; it is also shown that changes in the volume of 
European exports and imports explain only a relatively small part 
of the deterioration of Europe's balance of payments. Changes in 
invisibles plus changes in Europe's relations with the rest of 
the world were much more important. This paper gives particular 
significance to an often neglected factor: the change in the 
absolute level of U.S. prices after decontrol in mid-1946.
2. There are two curious things to notice: the first is 
that the need for the Marshall Plan emerged suddenly in 1947, two 
years after the cessation of hostilities; the second is that the 
country that received most American aid was Great Britain, a 
country that after the war had a much higher level of output than 
before the war and where economic development was much more 
satisfactory than in Continental Europe. On the first point an 




























































































"The first twelve to eighteen months after the close of 
hostilities were months of rapid economic 
reconstruction and recovery. The period since then was 
characterized by retardation of economic progress in so 
many countries that the year 1947 must be regarded as 
one of frustrated hopes."(1)
After the great optimism of 1946 frustration and deep 
pessimism seemed to prevail in Europe. The US Administration was 
clearly taken by surprise by the turn of events. It had been 
convinced that after the big appropriations for the Bretton Woods 
institutions, for UNRRA and for the British Loan, plus emergency 
relief for liberated areas, no more big sums would be needed. 
Instead a dramatic crisis emerged. Secretary of State Marshall 
returned from Moscow on 28 April 1947, fearing total economic 
disintegration in Europe in a very short period. He summoned 
Kennan the next day and gave him an astonishing short period 
(about two weeks) to form a study group and propose a solution to 
the problem (2).
This explains the title of this paper: why 1947? What had 
happened that had proved wrong all the previsions of the early 
post-war period? It is interesting to note in passing that the 
year 1946 is usually treated with much less attention than the 
earlier or following years. Those who are interested in why the 
United States did give help usually stress three points: fear of 
a post-war depression, interest in reconstructing world trade on 
a multilateral and non-discriminatory basis, and containment of 
communism. Because of this they tend to concentrate on post-war 
discussions made during or soon after the war, when fear of a 
post-war depression was widespread, or on a later period, when 




























































































relative neglect of 1946, the year in which, from the European 
point of view, things started to turn sour towards the end.
The second important point that has to be considered is to 
whom the US gave most of its aid. Of the total of net 
authorizations of the US Government that is, loans and credits 
available to foreign countries, between 1 July 1945 and 30 June 
1947, over 55% went to only one country: the United Kingdom. 
Also from 3 April 1948, the day when the Marshall Plan started 
(apart from interim aid) to 30 June 1949 by far the largest share 
went to the UK, with over 30% of the total (3)..
This is particularly interesting because the UK was one of 
the very few countries that emerged from the war with a far 
better industrial structure than the one she had in the thirties. 
Her industrial production had evolved much more favourably than 
in other European countries. Compared with 1938 industrial 
production in the UK for 1946, 1947 and 1948 was 106, 114 and 128 
respectively. Similar figures for western Europe were 77, 87 and 
101.
If global figures were good, detailed ones had even more 
positive features. The production of steel ingots and castings 
was already in 1946 22% above 1938, while the output of 
electricity was an amazing 69% above 1938. Steel production of 
the European countries, including the UK in 1946 was 40% below 
1938. In the UK also agricultural production had evolved 
favourably during the war.
Foreign trade figures in volume show a surprisingly positive 
achievement. Already in 1946 the volume of British exports was 




























































































pre-war. By the second half of 1947, when there was widespread 
fear for the future of the British economy following the collapse 
of sterling convertibility, the volume of exports was 15% above 
its 1938 level while the volume of imports was 23% below its 1938 
level. The composition of exports had also changed; coal had 
almost disappeared while textiles were below (26%) their 1938 
level. But the following items showed high rates of growth over 
their 1938 level: machinery exports 68%, vehicles 110%, 
chemicals 46% and electrical goods 79%. Although coal was 
vitally needed and its shortage retarded reconstruction, these 
figures show the modernization achieved by British industry. But 
the situation described is paradoxical: the US gave most of its 
aid to the country that was better off and whose foreign trade 
had shown most progress.
3. In order to verify the thesis that Marshall aid was 
necessary because of physical destruction, it is necessary to 
look at figures of physical production. Global figures are 
available but with a wide margin of error; OEEC publications of 
the fifties preferred to omit the figures for total OEEC 
industrial production in 1946 and 1947 (4). Although the figures 
presented here should not be taken as very accurate, the picture 
they give is sufficiently clear. By the third quarter of 1946 
industrial production in the countries that would become 
participants in the Marshall Plan had almost reached the 1938 
level and comfortably exceeded it by the second quarter of 1947 
if Germany is excluded. Including Germany, industrial production 
was about 80% of the 1938 level in the last quarter of 1946 and 




























































































operative, industrial production of ERP countries was above the 
1938 level including Germany; excluding her it was about 20% 
higher (6).
If the figures for industrial production were relatively 
satisfactory, the same cannot be said for agriculture. Cereal 
production for participating countries plus Germany for 1946-47 
was about 14% below the 1934-38 average. What is more important 
however is that the following year production fell further. 
Cereal production in 1947-48 was 15.6 million metric tons below 
the 1934-38 average, but over 40% of this difference was due to 
the decline that occurred between 1946-47 and 1947-48 (7). 
Clearly climatic conditions played an important part in worsening 
the European outlook in 1947. Already in 1946 meteorological 
conditions were abnormal, with a terrible drought in eastern 
Europe. Rumania's harvest in that year was about a third of its 
normal level; parts of the Soviet Union, like the Ukraine, 
suffered their worst drought in fifty years. 1947 started with 
terrible cold in Britain, France and Belgium, with heavy 
consequences for agricultural and industrial production; later 
drought fell on western Europe, once again damaging agriculture 
and (hydroelectric) electricity . This led some authors, like 
Woytinsky to assert that the 1947 European crisis was due in 
great part to an insufficient harvest (8).
The value of output per inhabitant is at best a very vague 
concept; in the circumstances of the early post-war period its 
relevance is still further reduced. Still, it is instructive 
that an attempt to compare physical output per inhabitant in 




























































































with 1938 figures show a decline of less than 7% (9). It should 
be noticed that these figures comprise some countries of eastern 
Europe, like Poland, where devastation was terribly serious. 
Naturally these figures do not include imported goods.
What is clear is that from this sort of very rough 
calculation recovery in production was quite encouraging; from 
this point of view, it cannot be said that there was a general 
economic collapse in Europe as some very highly placed members of 
the Truman Administration seemed to fear. Indeed, the 
performance of the European economy was much better after the 
Second than after the First World War. As mentioned above, 
manufacturing production of OEEC countries, including Germany, 
had regained its 1938 level by 1948, that is, three years after 
the end of the war. After the First World War manufacturing 
production of the same countries regained its 1913 level more 
than six years after the end of the war; by 1924 it was still 
below 1913 (10). If we compare 1920 with July 1946-June 1947, 
industrial production of OEEC countries was 76% of 1913 in 1920 
and 80% of 1938 in 1946-47 if we include Germany; excluding her 
the figures are 83% for 1920 and 95% for 1946-47. This includes 
mining, building and construction for 1946-47 but not for 1920; 
had it been possible to exclude these sectors for the second 
post-war the comparison would have been even more favourable 
(11). It could be objected that this comparison is unfair, 
because 1913 was a peak year while 1938 was a year of relative 
stagnation and that by comparing both post-war performances with 
these two years gives an unduly positive picture of the recovery 




























































































this distortion: apart from the fact that, as has already been 
mentioned, building and mining is included for 1946-47 which 
lowers the performance of this period, the index uses 1947 
weights for the UK, had 1938 weights been used the second 
recovery would look still better. And it should not be forgotten 
that although both periods start fourteen months after the end of 
the war, 1946-47 includes the effects of completely abnormal 
weather.
These production figures are however not enough to have an 
adequate picture. It is possible to envisage a situation in 
which the destruction of capital has been so heavy that, although 
the flow of production is satisfactory, so many resources have to 
be devoted to rebuilding means of communication, factories and 
houses that not enough is left to satisfy consumption. This 
would be extremely unlikely, as it is not easy to have a high 
flow of production without adequate communications or industrial 
equipment; still, it is a possibility.
Figures for investment are impossible to compare; in some 
countries they include repairs, in others they do not; 
furthermore, the element of depreciation is totally artificial, 
especially in the early post-war years. The following few 
generalizations may however be made: 1) in most European 
countries investment was channelled into heavy industry; 2) 
investment in agriculture was usually neglected, although figures 
may give a too strong impression of this as they often do not 
include increases in livestock, 3) investment in stocks was 
extremely heavy. In the case of Norway and Holland probably more 




























































































of stocks of raw materials and consumer goods. A normal figure 
would have been about 1%. Finally, investment in transport was 
also abnormally heavy. Probably net investment in transport was 
as large as net investment in manufacturing; in the US 
investment in transport in 1947 was about 1/6 of investment in 
manufactures (12).
4. It is now time to deal with the problem of foreign trade. 
It would be reasonable to assume that the need for the Marshall 
Plan, which was after all a way to allow Europe to receive goods 
which otherwise she would not have been able to buy, was due to a 
big trade gap. A devastated continent had to devote all possible 
resources to reconstruction and therefore had to export less and 
import more than before the war. This possibility justified the 
brief discussion on investment and rebuilding of stocks above.
Looking at the figures, however, we notice that although it 
is certainly true that Europe's exports were much lower in volume 
in 1946 and 1947 than in 1938, also imports were below the 1938 
level. Reconstruction did divert resources from exports; it was 
not however achieved through huge imports. In 1946 Europe's 
total imports were only 67% of their 1938 volume; in 1947 81% 
and in 1948, 86% (13).
At 1938 prices exports in 1946 were 51% of 1938, in 1947 they 
were 64% and in 1948 82%. If we take only ERP countries, by 1947 
the volume of extra European exports was 75% of 1938 while 
extra-European imports were 95% of 1938. But by 1948 
extra-European trade, in volume, was not very different from 





























































































5. It is clear from all this that it is impossible to 
understand the crisis in Europe's balance of payments by looking 
at data expressed in physical quantities. The Marshall Plan was 
necessary to solve a financial problem; to understand why it was 
needed one must study financial data, including prices. Figures 
of export and import volumes compared with their 1938 values give 
no indication of the balance of payments problem not least 
because although in 1938 Europe's current account was in balance, 
she had a huge trade deficit: the value of exports covered less 
than 2/3 of imports. With the US the situation was worse: 
exports covered less than one half of imports. (This is using 
European data. Using American data Europe covered 2/3 of her 
imports from the US with exports.)
This made invisibles, plus gold production in the Sterling 
Area, key elements in paying for the trade deficit. This 
explains the paradox of the amount of American aid to Britain: 
British exports could well be above their 1938 level while import 
volumes were below their 1938 level, but this did not mean that 
Britain had ceased to have a trade deficit. And if account was 
taken of prices and invisibles, a foreign exchange crisis could 
easily coexist with an impressive improvement in export and 
import volumes from their pre-war level.
In 1938 Europe had a current account deficit with the US of 




























































































the world. Its total trade deficit of about $2.1 billion was 
covered for two thirds by income from investments, while the 
remaining third was covered with shipping, tourism, etc.
One major difference after the war was that invisibles became 
negative, and did not help to cover the trade gap, which was $5.1 
billion in 1946 and $6.9bn in 1947. The publications of the UN 
and OEEC give very detailed information on Europe's balance of 
payments. In this paper for reasons of space they will not be 
repeated, instead attention will be paid to aspects which are 
less frequently discussed and that are also relevant to the 
foreign exchange crisis of 1947.
If we try to see how much did the main factors weigh in the 
deterioration of Europe's current account between 1938 and 1946 
we have some surprising results. The change in income from 
investments and service receipts is the main cause, responsible 
for 48% of the deterioration; 35% is due to price rises and only 
16% to changes in the real volume of trade. This explains how 
there could be a serious balance of payments crisis although 
trade volumes had not changed too dramatically. Even with no 
change in the volume of exports and imports from their 1938 level 
the crisis would have been almost as serious. It was not due so 
much to physical destruction as to the liquidation of foreign 
investments and to the changed role of Europe in the world (15).
There is an important point, however, that has to be kept 
firmly in mind. The figures discussed above refer to Europe's 
balance of payments with the whole of the rest of the world. But 
the key problem was Europe's dollar deficit, a very different 




























































































increased domestic consumption in some overseas countries and the 
Cold War meant that Europe obtained less goods from non-dollar 
sources than before the war; very often she was forced to import 
from the U.S. goods which previously had come from other areas. 
This effect, although it did not increase the overall deficit of 
E.R.P.. countries, had a very serious effect on their payments 
position. A clear example is given by trade with Eastern Europe: 
a zone which before the war had sent to Western Europe abundant 
supplies of agricultural goods and coal. With increasing 
East-West tensions, many of these supplies were no longer sent 
West, with the result that OEEC countries had to buy them 
overseas, frequently paying for them in dollars.
In volume terms by 1947 OEEC imports from North America were 
about double their 1938 level, while their exports to that area 
were about 80% of their 1938 level. There was therefore a 
deterioration in volume terms in Europe's trade with the US. But 
these changes in volume do not explain even half of the 
deterioration of Europe's balance of trade with the US (16). 
According to the BIS Europe's exports to the US in 1938 were $0.6 
bn. while her imports from that source amounted to $1.3 bn. A 
decrease of 20% in exports and an increase of 100% in imports 
would explain a deficit of $2.12 bn.; instead, in 1947 the trade 
deficit with the US was $5.2 bn. Clearly prices were at least as 
important as changes in volume.
6. Before discussing what in this paper is considered the 
main cause of the 1947 financial crisis, i.e. the rise in the 
level of American prices in the second half of 1946, another 




























































































dollar balance of payments of non-European countries. For Europe 
this meant that areas that had traditionally supplied her with 
dollars now became a dollar drain. As for the countries that had 
traditionally financed their deficits with the U.S. with a 
surplus with Europe, their huge dollar deficit inevitably forced 
them to demand dollars from Europe in a much more forceful 
manner. And it should be noted that in 1947 there was an abrupt 
deterioration in the dollar position of the non-European world 
that had serious repercussions for Europe's balance of payments.
Between 1946 and 1947 the net balance on goods and services 
of the US improved sharply from $7.8 bn. to $11.3 bn. Of this 
deterioration in the position of the rest of the world vis-à-vis 
the U.S. only one-third was due to ERP countries; the rest 
originated in other countries. Indeed, it is worth noticing that 
countries that were not touched by the war had a much more 
serious deterioration in their dollar position in 1947 than 
Europe. Between 1946 and 1947 the net balance on goods and 
services of the U.S. improved by 28.4% with ERP countries, but 
by 68.7% with Canada and Newfoundland and by 220% with Latin 
American countries (17). In the interwar period, the US usually 
had a trade surplus with all areas except tropical countries and 
producers of some commodities such as copper. These commodities 
were needed in the US and did not harm American producers, 
therefore tariff protection was low. But tropical countries 
imported little from the US; their inhabitants were often too 
poor to afford the advanced products in which the US were clearly 
superior. Usually also tropical countries were colonial 




























































































Imperial metropolis. In this way, plus the fact that they had to 
service their debts, India and Malaya earned dollars for Britain, 
as the East Indies did for the Netherlands.
This changed drastically after the war. Asian colonies had 
suffered from the war and their capacity to export was 
temporarily reduced, while India, approaching independence and 
with huge sterling balances was unwilling to supply dollars to 
Britain.
For the Sterling Area the difference is striking: while in 
1934-38 India (including what was to become Pakistan) plus Ceylon 
and the Colonies had a trade surplus with the dollar area of 
about 210 million dollars a year in 1947 they had a dollar trade 
deficit of about 136 million. Thus, while before the war their 
dollar surplus covered about 46% of Britain's dollar trade 
deficit, in 1947, instead of contributing to Britain's dollar 
problems, they aggravated it.
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa had a different trade 
pattern. They had rich white inhabitants who already in the 
interwar period could purchase the new products of the United 
States; furthermore, their geographical characteristics made 
them prefer lorries, tractors and cars of an American and not 
European type. As for their exports they often competed directly 
with American agricultural production, and faced protectionist 
barriers in the US. Their dollar trade deficit had averaged 140 
million dollars in 1934-38; in 1947 it was 609 million.
The impact of this change in trade with the dollar area by
countries of the Sterling Area other than the UK can be




























































































dollar trade deficit of 525 million, while the rest of the 
Sterling Area had a surplus of $58m.; in 1947 the UK had a 
dollar trade deficit of $1476 million while the rest of the 
Sterling Area had a deficit of $900 million. If instead of 
comparing 1947 with 1934-38 we compare it with 1946, we obtain an 
equally striking difference. Between 1946 and 1947 the UK's 
dollar deficit more than doubled, jumping from $1260 million to 
$2657 million. Of this deterioration of $1414 million only $481m 
(or about one third) was due to the UK's balance of trade, the 
rest was due to services (in great part military expenditure) as 
well as dollars for the dollar deficit of the rest of the 
Sterling Area. Britain had also to supply dollars to other 
non-dollar countries that demanded payment in dollars for their 
exports in order to alleviate their dollar problem. The latter 
factors were far more important than the deterioration in 
Britain's balance of trade: in 1946 the rest of the Sterling 
Area had supplied Britain with $44 million, in 1947 it cost 
Britain $849 million, a swing of $983. Other non-dollar 
countries had supplied Britain in 1946 with $291 million, in 1947 
they obtained from Britain $625 million, a swing of $916 million. 
It should be remembered that Britain's dollar trade deficit had 
deteriorated far less ($481m)(18).
It is quite clear therefore that the worsening in Britain's 
dollar position had much less to do with the state of physical 
reconstruction than to government policy (military expenditure 
and relief in Germany) and to changes in other countries. Calls 
for increased austerity could not solve the problem.




























































































World War the US had a trade surplus not only with the European 
countries ($8.5 bn in 1946 and 1947) but with the rest of the 
world as well ($6.1 bn in 1946 and 1947). This was in marked 
contrast with the experience after the First World War (1919 and 
1920), when the US trade surplus with Europe was $7.7 bn but 
there was an American trade deficit with the rest of the world 
excluding Europe of $800 million. In this way in 1919 and 1920 
the US had a global trade surplus that was smaller than its trade 
surplus with Europe, while in 1946-47 its global trade surplus 
was about 70% higher than its trade surplus with Europe. In 
current dollars, Europe's trade deficit with the US was only 10% 
higher in 1946 and 1947 than in 1919 and 1920. The US global 
trade surplus was however more than double in the two years after 
the Second World War than after the corresponding period after 
the First World War. This is another way of saying that after 
the Second World War the "dollar shortage" had become a problem 
for the whole world and not just for Europe.
It is because of this that extra-European countries clamoured 
for dollars from Europe, as has been seen above, this had a very 
serious effect on Europe's balance of payments in 1947. The 
situation was particularly serious for countries who had 
trad i t. iona.1 ly financed their deficit. with the US with their 
surplus from Europe. Canada and Argentina furnish a good 
example: both countries had an extremely serious balance of 
payments crisis in 1947 although their current account remained 
in equilibrium. Their real problem was that they could not use 





























































































In 1947 Canada had a current account surplus of C $85m. but 
this was composed of a deficit with the US of C $1135m., a 
surplus with the Sterling Area of C $874 and a surplus with other 
countries of C $346m. (19). Notwithstanding its current account 
surplus and the fact that it obtained dollars from the Sterling 
Area and from other countries by the end of 1947 Canada faced an 
extremely serious balance of payments crisis. Foreign exchange 
reserves collapsed in a short period from C $1638.7m. to C 
$461m. and stringent direct controls had to be imposed on 
imports (20).
Argentina had a similar experience. Although its current 
account balance for 1947 was approximately in balance (the 
deficit was about 30 million dollars) the decline in her gold and 
convertible foreign exchange was about 700 million dollars. In 
great part this was due to the fact that her surpluses with 
Europe could not be used to pay for her deficits with the US. 
Not surprisingly the utmost pressure was exerted in order to 
obtain dollars in part payment for her exports to Europe, thus 
aggravating Europe's position (21).
The dollar needs of other countries had a dramatic impact 
on the balance of payments of ERP nations. In 1946 their deficit 
with the US on goods and services was $4.2 bn. while they had to 
give $327m. in dollars to other countries. In 1947 their total 
dollar needs jumped from $4500m. to $8.1 bn. but most of this 
deterioration was not due to a higher current account deficit of 
ERP countries with the US. Most of it was caused by the fact 
that non-European countries demanded (and were able to obtain) a 




























































































deficit of ERP countries with the US passed from $4.2bn. to 
$5.3bn , but net dollar payments to other countries passed from 
£327m. to $2740m. (22).
7. Clearly there must be some factor, not related directly 
to wartime destruction that explains why there was a crisis in 
1947 and why the deterioration in the balance of payments was 
similar in war torn countries and in countries that had not 
suffered from war destruction. The thesis of this paper is that 
this factor was the violent rise in US prices in the second half 
of 1946. This had immediate consequences for . the rest of the 
world: even without changes in volume, nor in terms of trade, it 
increased proportionately the dollar trade deficit of the rest of 
the world; it reduced proportionately the real value of dollar 
reserves of the rest of the world; it not only reduced 
proportionately the real value of gold reserves but also of 
current gold production, as well as affecting negatively the 
volume of gold output and encouraging private gold hoarding. It 
also reduced the real value of European income from investments 
in the US, as bonds remained stable and share prices and 
dividends rose less than prices.
It should be noticed that this does not touch the question of 
changes in the terms of trade, which on the whole did not 
deteriorate as much as could be expected. They seem to have 
worsened for Britain and improved for Continental Europe; on the 
whole European terms of trade do not seem to have changed much, 
although in many cases this only meant that inflation accelerated 
without corresponding alterations in official exchange rates. In 




























































































hard currency markets, where their products were not competitive, 
and had to sell in soft currency markets. In this paper 
attention is concentrated on the effects of the change in the 
absolute, not the relative, level of US prices.
That this could seriously affect European recovery was 
realized only after some time. By then to stress the damage that 
the rise in US prices had inflicted on Europe would only have 
aided the enemies of the Marshall Plan. Those civil servants and 
experts that realized the unexpected effect of American inflation 
on Europe therefore usually preferred to mention the problem but 
not to give to it a central role. After all, through US aid 
Europe's balance of payments was being supported and this was 
what mattered most.
It may be useful at this point to give an indication of how 
much American prices rose. If 1938=100, the prices of the 
following products in January 1947 and January 1948 in the US 
were: maize 242 and 493; wheat 234 and 333; raw cotton 354 and 
391; lead 273 and 316. Weighting the main commodities according 
to each commodity's share in Europe's total imports from overseas 
in 1947 we have January 1947 243 and January 1948 301 (23). We 
therefore have at least a doubling of the pre-war level of prices 
by 1947 and a trebling for 1948.
To have an idea of what this meant for Europe it may be 
pointed out that in 1946 US merchandise exports to ERP countries 
were $4383m while their merchandise exports from those same 
countries were only $757m. These are figures for the whole year 
and therefore already include a good part of commodities that 




























































































is clear that with such an enormous trade imbalance, a rise in US 
prices even without a change in the terms of trade, was bound to 
have a devastating impact on Europe, as the dollar value of the 
trade deficit increased in the same proportion as the level of 
prices.
Between 1946 and 1947, Europe's current account deteriorated 
by 1700 million dollars. In this period income from investments 
improved by 100 million dollars, thus the other two factors 
accounted for a worsening in Europe's current account of 1800 
million dollars. Of these, only $250 million were due to changes 
in the real volume of exports and imports, 1550 million dollars 
or 91% of the whole retrogression of Europe's current account was 
due to the increase in the absolute level of prices(24).
The calculations of the Economic Commission for Europe may 
contain debatable elements, using different weights the results 
could perhaps change substantially. What cannot be doubted, 
however, is the devastating effect that the increase in US prices 
had on Europe's balance of payments. It reduced the real value 
of its reserves, it reduced the purchasing power of gold, the 
biggest dollar earners of the Sterling Area, and it increased in 
the same proportion the trade deficit that Europe had always had 
with the US.
What is astonishing is that there seems to have been no 
premonition at all of the danger that a higher absolute level of 
prices posed for Europe. On the contrary, it is possible to find 
complacency about the possibility of higher prices. This was 
perhaps a residue of discussions after the First World War, when 




























































































reduced the real burden of war debts and reparations. After the
Second World War Britain had again the prospect of having to
repay a huge loan to the US. In a totally mistaken analysis in
which it was thought that the important factor was relative and
not absolute level of prices, an authoritative publication in The
Statist represents this view.
"Yet American prices cannot be considered in vacuo.
For our net position with reference to the United 
States depends upon the relative movements of sterling 
and dollar prices."
And it concludes
"To take a realistic (but by no means cynical) point of 
view, a steady tendency to rising prices both here and 
in America over the next few years may well lighten the 
real burden of repayment of debt to the United States 
without doing harm to the creditor."(25)
It is worth noting that this comment was written as a note on
the fact that the price control Bill had not been renewed in the
United States because of the conflict between the President and
Congress. This fact, that was to double American prices in a
short period of time and was to have devastating effects on
Europe, was seen with benevolence. The same extraordinary
mistake was made, remarkably enough, by the experts of the
countries that were to receive Marshall Aid. In the General
Report of the Committee of European Co-operation there is an
appendix on the balance of payments, where the causes of the
'dollar problem' are listed. Three reasons are given:
i)reduction of invisibles;
ii)deterioration of the terms of trade; and
iii)reduction of supplies from South-East Asia and eastern 
Europe that had to be replaced with imports from the US.




























































































countries as a group usually imported from the American Continent
"more than twice as much as they exported", the experts did not
realize that this meant that a doubling of prices automatically
meant a doubling of the dollar deficit. On the contrary, the
Annex on the Terms of Trade concludes:
"The assumption that the prices of exports will be 
unchanged and that the prices of imports will be 
reduced is made in order to put the matter in a simple 
form. In fact no doubt the prices of both exports and 
imports will vary; but what matters is the relative 
change in import and export prices." (26).
It is ironic that a Report that was instrumental in obtaining
Marshall Aid should have such a non-sensical conclusion:
"The facts and estimates contained in this and other 
Reports show that the problem of the dollar deficit of 
the participating countries reflects the fundamental 
fact that production in the American continent 
increased greatly during the war, while production in 
Europe fell to a very low figure and can only gradually 
catch up with the increase of production in the 
American continent. The problem of this dollar deficit 
is inevitably a continuing problem until the increase 
of production in the American continent is paralleled 
by as great or a greater increase of production in the 
participating countries." (27)
9. The doubling of dollar prices not only halved the real 
value of the foreign exchange reserves of European countries; it 
also had a similar effect on their gold stocks, due to the fact 
that the dollar price for gold had not changed. Moreover, there 
were other adverse consequences, as gold was not only a very big 
element in European reserves; it was also one of the most 
important commodities that earned dollars for Europe, although in 
an indirect way.
To understand better how inflation affected negatively the 




























































































review briefly the role of gold in the thirties when, through a 
rise in its real value, gold contributed powerfully to restore 
international equilibrium.
The financial crisis of 1931 and the devaluatin of sterling 
made it only too clear that the gold exchange standard, that had 
been recommended by the 1922 Genoa Conference because of fear of 
a probable future shortage of monetary gold, was a very dangerous 
system. Central Banks suffered tremendous losses on their 
sterling assets and, not surprisingly, frantically liquidated 
their remaining foreign exchange holdings., converting them into 
gold. In a very short period the percentage of foreign exchange 
on total reserves for the Central Banks of the main 24 countries 
of Continental Europe collapsed from 42% to 8%. Naturally this 
drastically reduced the global amount of international liquidity 
available (28).
But the reduction in the value of international liquidity was 
soon compensated by three main factors which were related to 
gold. The first was the fall in commodity prices, the second was 
the generalized devaluation of currencies and the third was an 
abrupt increase in gold production as well as massive 
dishoarding. The first two factors raised the real value of the 
existing gold reserves; the third increased the amount of 
physical gold available for monetary purposes.
Commodity prices, especially of commodities entering 
international trade, fell heavily. By 1932 gold prices of world 
trade were less than half that of 1929 (29). This clearly 
resulted in an increase in the real value of existing gold 




























































































capital flight, or by the vain hope of raising commodity prices 
(as in the US), or by beggar-my-neighbour policies. Although at 
the end of the cycle of devaluations some key exchange rates were 
not very different from those prevailing at the beginning of the 
period there was an enormous difference. The market value of 
gold stocks had risen by about 70%, in line with the change in 
the dollar price of gold from $20.67 to $35, while dollar 
commodity prices in the thirties were below their 1929 level.
In this painful and roundabout way the real value of 
international reserves was restored. There was, furthermore, 
another factor at work. The main gold producing countries had 
also devalued; on average the price of gold in terms of their 
domestic currencies had risen by about 76% between 1929 and 1936, 
while the price of goods had fallen by about 15%. This made gold 
production enormously profitable, and in a world ravaged by 
depression and starved for markets, gold producers were about the 
only ones with a guaranteed buyer for their whole output at an 
extraordinarily favourable price. It is not surprising that in 
such conditions gold production increased impressively. Between 
1929 and 1939 the physical amount of gold mined increased by 85%, 
while the dollar value of each ounce had grown by almost 70%. 
The reaction of gold producers is all the more striking if the 
strategy of South Africa, the world's largest producer, is taken 
into account. There, it had been decided to use the high price 
of gold not so much to increase production as to mine lower grade 
deposits, leaving the richer deposits for leaner times. Because 
of this, South Africa's share of world gold production fell from 




























































































production increased by an amazing 162.6% between 1929 and 1939 
(30). This was reinforced by massive gold dishoarding in the 
East, which in 1932 amounted to about one half of world 
production.
All these factors combined made it possible for the world's 
stock of monetary gold to increase between 1929 and 1939 from 
$11.4 billion to $31.3 billion, that is, more than amply 
compensating the gap that had been created by the collapse of the 
gold-exchange standard (31).
The experience of the thirties has been, discussed in so much 
detail in order to show the contrast with the early post-war 
period. All the factors that in the thirties had helped gold to 
alleviate the shortage of international liquidity now worked in 
reverse, although Europe desperately needed financial resources 
to pay for imports. First of all, the dollar price of gold 
remained fixed at $35 an ounce although dollar prices had 
doubled. This halved the purchasing power of the $10 billion of 
dollar and gold reserves of the European countries that 
participated in the Marshall Plan. The gold reserves of these 
countries at the end of 1945 were $7673 dollars (32). Gold 
production was also discouraged by the new relationship between 
rising costs and fixed prices. If we exclude the Soviet Union as 
well as South Africa, whose output fluctuated less for the 
reasons discussed above, gold production in 1946-47 was less than 
half that in 1935. Part of this was due to the ravages of war, 
but the economic factors were important, although some countries 
decided to subsidize gold producers. Between 1939 and 1946 gold 




























































































Also hoarding worked in the opposite direction. Now the 
official price of gold in terms of commodities had become cheap. 
This led to hoarding, that is, an increase in private gold stocks 
at the expense of monetary stocks. Precisely when international 
liquidity was most needed, a big part of gold production was 
unavailable for this purpose. In the thirties the private sector 
had released gold, therefore the increase in the world's monetary 
stock had been higher than world gold production; in the 
post-war world the opposite happened. In 1946 over half of the 
production of gold of the world disappeared into the hands of the 
public. Troubled conditions in many parts of the world were 
certainly important, especially in China. A good part of the 
explanation was however in Europe. The Swiss National Bank, for 
instance, was selling in 1946 one million Swiss francs of gold 
coins a week to the public; after mid-1946 this was raised to 3 
million. Although it demanded a written pledge from buyers (who 
had to be Swiss nationals) not to re-sell these coins, a part of 
them ended up abroad, where gold had a premium on the black 
market ranging from 170% in Paris to 200% in Lisbon (33).
Whether gold had to be revalued was sometimes heatedly 
debated; not surprisingly the US were totally opposed to the 
idea. Their main argument, was that it would divert resources 
needed for reconstruction to unproductive use in gold mines and 
that it would cause inflation. The South African Minister of 
Finance, Havenga, could attack the US by pointing out that it was 
only too advantageous for some countries to sell their exports at 
post-war prices while buying gold at its pre-war price (34), but 




























































































at $35 an ounce, the US were guaranteeing a minimum price for 
gold. Chiefley, the Australian Prime Minister was reported to 
have declared: "There's only one buyer of gold -- the United 
States. It might stop buying."(35)
The main effect of the fixed dollar price for gold was on the 
Sterling Area. Before the war, this area had an annual trade 
deficit with the dollar area of about $450 million; at that 
time, gold production in the Sterling area was about $550 
million. This shows the enormous importance of gold for Britain; 
the impression is further reinforced if one compares gold with 
the other main dollar earners of the Sterling area before the 
war. Compared with over $500 million for gold, exports of the 
two main commodities to the US were: rubber $113 million and tin 
$58 million (1934-38 averages). Total US imports from the UK in 
that same period averaged about $150 million.
After the war the role of gold in the balance of payments in 
the Sterling Area had clearly changed. The decline in physical 
production was about 13%, the real problem however was that its 
price had remained fixed. In 1946 gold production of the 
Sterling Area covered only 1/3 of the dollar trade deficit of the 
UK. Had its price doubled or trebled like so many other 
commodities the balance of payments of the UK would have been 
very different. To say that it would have been in equilibrium is 
clearly impossible, because a higher gold price would have meant 
larger dollar imports in South Africa and could also have changed 
the very complex ties between South Africa and the Sterling Area, 
that were in a period of rapid change. Still, a lower level of 




























































































improved the balance of payments of the UK very significantly; 
perhaps enough to leave a deficit that could have been financed 
by existing reserves.
The connections between the price of gold and the need for
the Marshall Plan did not pass unnoticed, although it was not
usually stressed as strongly as below.
"Dans ces conditions, on peut conclure que, tout au 
moins dans le cas de la Grande Bretagne, le Plan 
Marshall aurait été superflu si le prix de l'or avait 
subi la même courbe ascendante que celui des autres 
matières premières." (36)
Seen from the point of view of the US the picture is equally 
clear. The US economy had traditionally had a trade surplus. 
This made gold a crucial item in supplying the rest of the world 
with the necessary means of payments to buy in the US. In 1938 
total US imports were $1960m. while world production of gold 
(excluding the US) was $1141m. and US net gold imports amounted 
to $1973m. The fact that in that year net gold imports into the 
US were similar to total US imports shows dramatically how a 
substantial change in the commodity value of gold inevitably had 
to upset the world's international financial equilibrium.
It should not be thought however that a doubling or even 
trebling of the dollar price of gold would have, by itself, 
solved the problems of the rest of the world vis-à-vis the US. 
In 1947 world gold production was about 24 million ounces while 
the US trade surplus was about $10 bn. For current gold 
production to equal the US trade surplus a price of more than 
$400 per ounce would have been necessary. Still, it should be 
remembered that gold stocks are very large if compared with gold 




























































































temporary disequilibrium. In 1947 ERP countries sent to the US 
about 41 million ounces while their deficit in goods and services 
with that country was about $5 bn. Had the price of gold in 
terms of US commodities not changed in the early post-war period 
Europe's situation would have improved substantially, although 
clearly serious problems would have remained.
Raising the price of gold remained in the following years a 
frequently discussed method of increasing reserves in line with 
US prices. It was the first of the various ways of increasing 
international reserves explored in a UN report of 1951 in which 
the level of reserves was considered inadequate (37). In early 
1952 there was again fear of a generalized dollar shortage, and 
by then the connection between the dollar price of gold and 
Europe's need for American assistance was more widely understood. 
In the City of London three alternative solutions to a 
generalized dollar shortage were being discussed: 1) another 
Marshall Plan; 2) a new devaluation of sterling and other 
commodities against the dollar, and 3) an increase in the dollar 
price of gold (38).
10. The main thesis of this paper is that the abrupt rise of 
American prices in 1946-47 had a devastating effect on the 
balance of payments of European countries and that it constitutes 
a major element in the explanation of the 1947 crisis; the 
question that has to be put is whether this rise could have been 
avoided.
First, there is the question of timing. It is important to 
stress that most of the increase in American prices did not occur 




























































































between 1939 and 1948 occurred after the surrender of Japan.
And, interestingly enough, despite a relaxation of price
controls, inflation was low until June 1946, when Congress
refused to renew a stringent Price Control Bill. Between August 
1945 and June 1946 wholesale prices rose by only 7% (39).
Yet inflationary pressures were very strong; currency plus 
adjusted demand deposits had doubled between 1939 and 1945 (40), 
while the gross debt of the US Government rose from $57.9bn in 
December 1941 to $258.7 bn in June 1945 (41).
It was inevitable that the maintenance of price controls 
under these circumstances should lead to tensions. At the end of 
June 1946, Congress instead of renewing a strong Price Control 
Bill approved an extremely weakened version that was in effect a 
Bill for the rapid dismantling of controls. Deeming the Bill 
unworkable, Truman vetoed it; a period of utter confusion 
followed when there were no controls whatsoever and there was 
great uncertainty about the future. Prices exploded, and on 25 
July 1946 a new, although much diluted Price Control Act was 
passed. It may be mentioned that Truman signed this Bill in a 
very skeptical mood (42). Price ceilings were reimposed on many 
commodities, but by now many producers were determined to win 
♦ heir struggle for frt?c? prices. Politically, the key issue 
became the control of the price of meat. Cattle was kept away 
from the market. In the brief interlude of no price controls 
meat prices had risen by 70% in a few days and slaughtering had 
been too high. In September and October meat was unobtainable at 
official prices "and public opinion showed very clearly that it 




























































































at controlled price "(43). It is perhaps possible to recapture
the feeling of the period in a Nero Wolfe detective novel.
"It was smack in the middle of the Great Meat Shortage,
when millions of pigs and steers, much to the regret of
the growers and slaughterers, had sneaked off and hid 
in order to sell their lives dear, and to Nero Wolfe a 
meal without meat was an insult." (44)
With elections approaching rapidly, Truman was forced to lift 
price controls on meat on 14 October 1946; in a week the 
wholesale price of meat increased by 93%.
This made the early end of price controls inevitable, as 
other producers began to withhold supplies in expectation of
higher prices. On 5 November the Republicans, who had made the
issue of a free economy and tax cuts central to their campaign, 
made enormous gains. In the old House of Representatives there 
were 241 Democrats and 192 Republicans; in the new House there 
were 188 Democrats and 246 Republicans. Defeated, on 10 November 
Truman lifted price controls, with the only exceptions of
residential rents, sugar and rice (45).
It is tempting to look at the struggle over price control 
purely in political terms but this would be unsatisfactory, as 
its maintenance already posed very serious problems in 1945. A 
brief examination of early American reconversion problems makes 
this abundantly clear. In order to understand the evolution of 
American economic policy it is essential to keep firmly in mind 
that there was quite a generalized consensus that a depression 
would follow the end of the war. The acceptance of 'Keynesian' 
ideas, in their simplest form, contributed to this climate. If 




























































































Government expenditure in GNP was drastically reduced, it was not 
difficult to obtain worrying results. Eight million unemployed 
were officially forecast for the spring of 1946 and this 
dominated the debate on economic policy.
The Administration did not have a clear policy for wages and 
prices, and the early termination of the war caught it unprepared 
to deal with this problem. With peace, the tacit no-strike, no 
lockout agreement between labour and management came to an end. 
Unions were impatient, as average weekly pay was reduced by the 
diminution of overtime and the forced shifting of labour to less 
well-paid jobs. Due to these causes in February 1946 weekly pay 
was about 14% lower than in April 1945; in the meantime prices 
had risen (46).
At the same time many employers wanted a rise in their prices 
as a compensation for the fact that they had been forced by the 
end of the war to concentrate on a less profitable product mix. 
As early as August 1945 the steel industry had asked the Office 
of Price Administration (OPA) for a substantial rise in the price 
of steel because of the decline in demand for its more profitable 
products (47). Under this sort of pressure OPA, under its very 
able chief, Chester Bowles, felt that the best defence was to 
allow changes in wages and prices as rarely as possible; any 
major concession would have meant a flood of similar claims. It 
would have been impossible to maintain control against both the 
wishes of labour and employers; in particular conflicts in the 
labour market looked menacing. But it was felt that even if more 
freedom was granted to labour to ask for higher wages a firm 




























































































these claims. Employers would resist wage increases in a much 
more determined way if they knew that they would not be able to 
transfer higher costs to prices. If increased costs had been 
taken as a reason for higher prices competitive pressure among 
firms eager to establish themselves in the post-war markets would 
have made them too anxious to avoid strikes and the consequent 
loss of market to rival firms.
Wage policy passed through three main phases in a very short 
period: after the end of the war labour partly regained its 
freedom; wage increases were allowed if they did not require 
higher prices from OPA. In October free collective bargaining 
was restored and it was established that firms had to wait for a 
six month period before asking for higher prices. At this stage 
a link had been established between costs and prices, albeit not 
an immediate one. The third stage started de facto in February 
1946, when increased wages and increased prices in the steel 
industry were announced simultaneously (48).
Growing wages and fixed prices were defended by those like 
Wallace who feared a depression. For business instead it became 
clear that profits were menaced and that it was essential to 
prepare the battle against the renewal of the Price Control Bill 
that was to expire in mid-1946.
Key political issues inevitably emerged. The CIO under 
Walter Reuther demanded a guarantee for fixed prices in its 
strike against General Motors, claiming that profits were 
sufficient to cover increased wage costs. General Motors replied 
that wages had to be determined by conditions in the labour 




























































































introduce a radically different type of social organization; it 
also refused to open its books to inspection and rejected 
Truman's suggestions for a conciliatory solution. To avoid 
political isolation the company made the good point that if their 
profits were considered to be excessive the correct solution was 
for OPA to order a reduction in prices in order to benefit all 
consumers. There was no reason why only General Motors workers 
should benefit (49).
Firms could afford strikes because of a provision of an early 
post-war Bill that allowed losses incurred in 1946 to be deducted 
from excess profits tax paid during the war. This had been done 
to stimulate investment in 1946 even if firms feared a 
depression; in the end it meant that more than 85% of losses 
suffered from strikes by profitable companies could be 
transferred to the shoulders of the US Treasury.
In early 1946 there was an explosion of strikes, as labour 
tried to regain purchasing power and firms resisted in order to 
defend their profits. Steel production, vitally needed for world 
reconstruction, was stopped for a month. Coal, another vital 
commodity of which there was an acute shortage, suffered a two 
month stoppage in April and May. About 90 million tons of coal 
were lost.
Controls were becoming unworkable, especially after the 
increase in the price of steel, a commodity that entered into so 
many other commodities. Ideologically the Administration was on 
the defensive, as it could not claim that in the long run a 
controlled economy worked better than a free market one. The 




























































































warn about runaway inflation if controls were lifted. But its
prestige was very low, and its mistaken forecasts about a
post-war depression had seriously diminished the credibility of
its inflation forecasts. The ideological pressure was very
strong, as can be seen by a statement by the President of the
National Association of Manufacturers.
"In peacetime, your government refuses to restore your 
economic liberties which were given away in wartime. 
Mussolini, Hitler, and Hirohito convinced the world in 
our time that individual liberty is inseparable from 
economic liberty. Today I speak for the return of the 
liberties we have lost." (50)
With the Cold War approaching and stoppages and shortages 
appearing with increasing frequency, it was perhaps inevitable 
that controls could not survive. The clearest case was 
agriculture. In early 1946 there seemed to be a famine ravaging 
Central Europe, in great part due to a wheat shortage. Yet at 
the end of 1945 wheat consumption in the US was about one third 
higher than in the same period of 1944. The reason was that the 
price ratio between maize and hogs made it profitable for farmers 
to feed hogs with their maize and not to sell maize on the 
market. Those who raised poultry and livestock using corn were 
forced to feed them with wheat, thus reducing supplies available 
for export. Chester Bowles, who felt ashamed at the amount of 
food that was on his table while Europe was menaced with 
starvation was in a dilemma. The Administration had promised 
that maize and hog prices would not be increased; yet the price 
relationship was distorting supplies. If the Administration 
yielded its credibility would be weakened further; if it kept 




























































































the Administration yielded (51).
After the war the mood was in favour of abolishing as many 
controls as possible, to reduce the weight of the Government in 
the economy and to reduce taxation. Tax cuts were enacted in 
1945 and further cuts were one of the main points in the 1946 
Republican campaign (52).
11. The main outline of this paper may now be reviewed. The 
problem to be explained is why Europe's need for the Marshall 
Plan appeared only in 1947 and why there was a balance of 
payments crisis in that year. We have seen that the performace 
of the indexes of physical production were much better than after
the First World War, when no need was felt for anything
resembling the Marshall Plan. On the contrary in the twenties
many felt that Europe could repay her war debts to the US.
Looking at trade figures in volume makes it clear that volume 
changes were not a crucial factor in the deterioration in 
Europe's position. Comparing 1946 with 1947 the main factor is
in the change in the absolute level of dollar prices, not because 
of the effect on the terms of trade but because Europe's trade 
with the US had always been in deficit, and a doubling of all 
prices meant a doubling in the dollar deficit even if no change 
in volume had occurred. An extreme example is Britain which in 
1937-38 had exported goods to the US for an average of $26m and 
imported goods from that source worth $116m. In such a situation 
a doubling of all prices with no change in volumes would have 
meant a deterioration in Britain's dollar position of almost 
$ 500m.




























































































with the dollar earnings of her colonies plus invisibles. After 
the Second World War the rest of the world, excluding Europe, had 
a deficit with the US. In contrast with what had happened after 
the First World War when the rest of the world had helped to 
solve Europe's dollar problem, now Europe had to give dollars to 
non-dollar countries. The non-dollar countries had become a 
heavy dollar burden.
The 1947 crisis was mainly a financial crisis, in the sense 
that production continued to recover but Europe seemed like 
running out of dollars and gold to pay for vital imports. The 
end of price controls and the rapid inflation in the US had three 
main effects: i) it doubled Europe's existing dollar trade 
deficit, ii) it halved the purchasing power of Europe's gold and 
foreign exchange reserves when they were most needed, and iii) it 
halved the purchasing power of gold production, with negative 
effects on both the volume of production and on hoarding.
To conclude two questions will be discussed briefly. The 
first concerns US controls and their relation to the Marshall 
Plan. Perhaps it is useful to interpret the facts described 
above in the following way: Europe needed a certain net amount 
of goods from the US. With her reserves, plus the British Loan, 
plus relief aid it seemed for a time that she could finance her 
needs for a reasonable amount of time, perhaps even until world 
trade returned to more normal conditions. But also American 
consumers wanted goods, and they had accumulated liquid resources 
that were vastly greater than Europe's. Compared with the $10 
bn. that Europe had at the end of the war, the gross debt of the 




























































































it in the hands of people who wanted to purchase goods as soon as 
they became available. Seen in this perspective, the rise in 
prices and its effect on Europe's capacity to purchase dollar 
goods is not casual. It is the natural outcome of a process of 
free bidding by different groups. The 1947 financial crisis was 
simply the reflection that Europe could not bid successfully 
against American consumers (as well as other foreign countries) 
for scarce goods. Marshall Aid may perhaps be seen as an 
intervention by the US Government to prevent US consumers from 
outbidding Europe. Goods were bought and sent to Europe with 
money taken away from the American public through taxes.
If we see the problem as a struggle between US consumers and 
Europe for a certain amount of goods, there could have been a 
deterioration in Europe's position even if the amount of goods 
she needed had not increased significantly. Clearly there could 
have been another solution: the maintenance of price and 
administrative controls. This was perfectly clear to some US 
economists during the war, most notably Hal B. Lary at the 
Department of Commerce. His exceptionally acute forecast is 
worth quoting.
"The real heart of the immediate post-war problem, 
however, will not be so much an initial general lack of 
purchasing power but a relative abundance of 
accumulated dollar reserves and the strength of demand, 
both domestic and foreign, in the face of a continued 
though temporary shortage of things -- goods and 
possibly also ships. Until these shortages are made 
good, only one solution is possible: continuation of 
allocation of supplies to meet the most urgent needs, 
rationing to the individual consumer, price control, 
and restraints in the liquidation of savings."(53)
In this sense the 1947 crisis can be seen as a financial 




























































































discussed above it was not easy to maintain strict controls in 
peace time, politically it was much more difficult than envisaged 
by planners during the war. The consequent rise in prices was a 
market way to solve the problem of allocation of supplies. The 
problem was that it dealt a devastating blow to Europe, although 
many both in Europe and in the US were not aware of this.
This raises another interesting problem: would a US post-war 
recession have helped Europe? In the forties there was a 
widespread fear in Europe of the cyclical instability of the US 
economy, and those who opposed an open world economy mainly did 
so on the grounds that such an organization of world trade would 
have made Europe too vulnerable to a US depression. Ironically 
enough, if the analysis presented here is correct, a US recession 
would have had quite a few redeeming features for Europe.
As mentioned, Europe had always exported very little to the 
US and therefore a fall in US demand would not have had a 
significant effect on employment in Europe. A recession would 
have significantly reduced the purchasing power of US consumers, 
and caused a fall in prices. This would have meant that with her 
reserves Europe would have been able to buy more goods while US 
consumers would have bought less, all this out of reduced volume 
of US production.
A comparison with the first post-war period may be 
instructive to underline some differences. After the First World 
War there was a very sharp but short depression, with the 
consequent collapse in prices. This helped Europe inasmuch as it 
increased the purchasing power of its gold reserves. There were 




























































































war debts with the US, and the real value of these debts was 
increased by the fall in prices. The other was that the US 
depression had a negative effect on Europe through its impact on 
colonies and other tropical countries. At that time these 
countries had a trade surplus with the US and a deficit with 
Europe (54). The US depression had in this way an indirect 
negative effect on Europe's dollar position. In a direct way, 
however, it reduced the dollar value of the trade deficit of 
Europe with the US.
After the Second World War the situation was very different 
from the point of view of colonial and other countries, as they 
also had a dollar deficit. A US recession would probably have 
reduced their demand for dollar goods. And a fall in dollar 
prices would have reduced their dollar deficit, while after the 
First World War it had reduced their dollar surplus. Furthermore 
they would have been much more willing to sell to Europe against 
soft currencies had there been a recession in the US. . But all 
these are unfortunately hypothetical discussions, and it was not 
necessary to have the pain and misery of a recession to restore 
some equilibrium in Europe's payments. What cannot be doubted is 
that the lifting of controls in the US in 1946 had a dramatic 
effect on Europe, reactivating inflation in many countries and 
aggravating the balance of payments.
All this teaches us once more that to understand what happens 
in a country or group of countries it is not enough to study 
them. It is essential to look at what happens in the centre of 
the world economy. The dollar was the world's key currency. An 
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